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Since the mid-2000s, terrorism has pushed the peripheries of West Africa 
into the news and the public eye. While the political implications of this 
phenomenon have been extensively documented, most commentators have 
adopted a zonal approach to terrorism in which the Sahel and the Sahara are 
usually  confused.  This  paper  assumes  that  this  confusion  dramatically 
highlights the failure of academic and common geography to think beyond 
territories in West Africa, and to move away from a „sedentary‟ vision of 
West African societies. The paper contributes to an understanding of the 
geographical locations of terrorism in West Africa by showing, firstly, what 
the main reasons behind the current confusion between the Sahel and Sahara 
are. Secondly, we show that this confusion arose from a territorial vision of 
space,  which  has  important  implications  not  only  for  local  economic 
activities, but also for our own understanding of the spatiality of networks in 
West Africa. 
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Introduction 
Since the taking hostage of 32 tourists in the Algerian Sahara in early 2003 by the Salafist 
Group  for  Preaching  and  Combat  (GSPC),  terrorism  has  pushed  the  peripheries  of  West 
Africa into the news and the public eye. From Mauritania to Chad, a score of kidnappings, 
killings and attacks  claimed by Islamist  groups have taken place, with eight Western aid 
workers and tourists, and at least 55 West African military and 73 terrorists killed as a result 
(see Appendix 1). Terrorism actions become possible through a combination of intense spatial 
mobility, which allows continuous circulation in desert areas, and a good knowledge of social 
networks, allowing terrorist groups to be supported by certain local actors. So far, the strategy 
of movement and network-based terrorism seems to defeat that of West African states, whose 
control of national territory and social networks is definitely lacking. 
 
While  the  political  and  military  implications  of  this  phenomenon  have  been  extensively 
documented, there is, however, considerable confusion surrounding the terms used to describe 
the spatiality of terrorism in West Africa. While some authors clearly identify the Sahelian 
and Saharan areas affected by this phenomenon (Ellis 2004, Keenan 2004a, 2004b, 2007, 
Antil 2006, Gutelius 2007), others use the words „Sahel‟ and „Sahara‟ indiscriminately to 
discuss the geographical context in which military and terrorist events take place (see Radu 
2004 or Khatchadourian 2006). Frequently, the Sahel is compared with a vast sanctuary that is 
outside the control of the states, these states being globally referred to as „Sahelian states‟ 
(Cline 2007, Zoubir 2009). According to Johnson (2009), for example, „much of the Sahel is 
vast, empty, trackless desert‟, a description that would be more appropriate in describing the 
Sahara. 
 
More surprisingly, some authors referring to the abductions of tourists and attacks of military 
forces that have occurred since the mid-2000s suggest that the Sahel – rather than the Sahara 
– is the real theatre for operations of Salafi terrorism in West Africa. This seems strange since 
the  very  name  of  the  main  terrorists  group  refers  specifically  to  the  „Islamic  Maghreb‟. 
Twenty or so Westerners are supposed to have been abducted „in the Sahel‟ by Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) over the last two years, according to Le Monde (Mandraud 
2010). „Extreme dangers located in the Sahel‟ are now threatening the lives of expatriates in 
this part of West Africa, according to Jeune Afrique (Barrada 2010), whereas, in the opinion 
of Libération „The Sahel is trapped in a war against Al Qaeda‟ (Ayad 2010) (our translations). 3 
 
This paper offers an alternative to these views. It assumes that the current confusion between 
the  Sahara  and  the  Sahel  dramatically  highlights  the  failure  of  academic  and  common 
geography to think beyond territories in West Africa and to move away from a „sedentary‟ 
vision  of  West  African  societies.  The  paper  contributes  to  an  understanding  of  the 
geographical locations of terrorism in West Africa by showing, firstly, what the main reasons 
behind the current confusion between the Sahel and Sahara are. Secondly, the paper shows 
that this confusion arose from a territorial vision of space, which has important implications 
not only for local economic activities, but also for our own understanding of the spatiality of 
networks in West Africa. 
 
Sahel vs. Sahara or Sahel-Sahara? 
At least two main reasons explain why the geography of terrorism in West Africa is currently 
so ill-defined. 
 
The Sahel and the Sahara are interconnected 
The first reason is linked to the very definition of the Sahel. By naming Sahel the „shore‟ 
reached after crossing the arid African Sahara, pre-colonial Arab traders had no idea how 
significant this term would hold today. After weeks spent walking alongside their camels, 
none of these merchants – incidentally proselytes of Islam – would have confused the Sahel 
with the Sahara they had left behind them. At the edge of the desert, pre-colonial „empires‟ – 
as African historical studies have named them for want of a better word – were controlling the 
inter-continental  trade  routes  which  supplied  North  Africa  with  luxury  goods,  including 
ostrich feathers, gold and slaves from Sudanese kingdoms. 
 
Later,  environmental  determinism  in  geography  contributed  to  the  confusion  in  the 
understanding  of  such  a  pattern  of  mobility,  by  dividing  West  African  space  into 
homogeneous  entities  on  the  basis  of  their  bioclimatic  features,  type  of  production,  and 
nomadic and sedentary „lifestyles‟, with nomadic pastoralism as an intermediary. According 
to this zonal conception of space, the Sahel is a strip of semi-arid land stretching from the 
Atlantic Ocean to Chad, characterised by steppe vegetation, and limited by 100-200 and 600-
700 mm of average annual rainfall. It is located between the Sahara to the north, and the 
Sudanese savannah to the south (see Map 1). Erratic rainfalls make such a definition very 
problematic and hypothetical. The reduction in rainfall since the late 1960s has notably led 
the southern border of the Sahara to move south, which means that the Sahel of today is not 4 
 
where it used to be. This also explains the fact that several popular maps seen in the media, 
obviously based on the average rainfall from the 1960s, locate the Sahel much further north 
than its current position shown in this paper based on the Sahel and West Africa Club studies. 
This has important consequences for the interpretation of the spatiality of terrorism in West 
Africa, as this paper will show. 
 




Sources: Sahel and West Africa Club and Centre Régional Agrhymet, Niger (Biogeography); Le Monde, Jeune 
Afrique, The New York Times, AFP, Ellis 2004, International Crisis Group 2005, Keenan 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 
2007, 2009, Cline 2007(Terrorism); Cartography: Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2005; modified by the 
authors. Note: see Appendix 1 for more information regarding each location. 
 
The Sahel is moving...and so are too the Sahelian populations. West African societies have, 
for centuries, built on such uncertainty, by adopting a high mobility, well before colonial and 
post-colonial powers introduced a fixed and territorial perspective in the region. Far from 
being limited to a climatic domain, the Sahel is rather a space of movement (Retaillé 1989). 
Sahara and Sahel are indeed bound by an old spatial legacy in which trans-Saharan roads and 
sedentary settlements are organised, from North to South , around a linear system of cities. 
This line of cities has certainly moved since the beginning of the colonial period because of 
the  creation  of  new  administrative  centres,  but  the  spatial  organisation  has  remained 
astonishingly  durable.  This  is  primarily  explained  by  the  fact  that,  contrary  to  naturalist 
descriptions, space is not organised along bioclimatic zones and lifestyles, but along social 
and  economic  exchanges:  in  such  a  circulation  space,  nomads  and  sedentary  populations 
intertwine. Economic roads supplying the growing urban centres of the region, traditional 5 
 
routes  for  nomadic  cattle  and  camel,  but  also  migration  and  illegal  trafficking  routes  all 
demonstrate this willingness to use the space of flows to the detriment of the space of places 
(Retaillé 1993). 
 
Map 2 (left) shows more precisely how trans-Saharan roads and sedentary settlements are 
distributed  in  West  Africa.  Depending  on  weather  conditions,  political  uncertainties, 
economic cycles, and demographic changes, the places organised in a linear way can „slide‟ 
northward or southward since they are not fundamentally tied to fixed routes such as tarred 
roads,  as  shown  by  the  stylised  Map  2  (right).  What  matters  most  in  such  a  spatial 
organisation is the maintenance of a high level of mobility. This form of integration is rather 
subtler than what the model based on a division of space between several zonal bioclimatic 
domains such as „Sahel‟ or „Sahara‟ separated by a fictitious boundary suggested. 
 





The spatial organisation in the Sahel-Sahara region makes clear that a purely zonal analysis of 
terrorist  activities  in  West  Africa  does  not  make  sense.  A  review  of  the  location  of 
kidnappings, murders and assaults since 2003 indicates that the Sahelian climatic domain has 
been less affected than the Sahara one (Map 1). Except for the kidnapping that occurred in the 
north-east of Niamey in December 2008, on the border between Mali and Niger, most terrorist 
attacks have occurred in what is known as the Sahara from a climatic point of view. The last 
kidnapping, which occurred in September 2010 in the mining town of Arlit in northern Niger, 6 
 
confirms this trend (see Number 1 on Map 1). Moreover, frequently, Westerners abducted in 
the extreme north of the Sahel are then transported in the Malian Sahara, which offers a real 
„sanctuary‟, unlike the most populated and heavily travelled Sahel. The reasons that make 
Malian  Sahara  a  base  for  hostage-takers  are  notably  linked  to  the  intensification  of  anti-
terrorism  in  Algeria.  With  the  help  of  a  large  and  well-equipped  army  and  intelligence 
services,  Algeria  has  succeed  in  gradually  pushing  extremist  groups  outside  its  borders. 
Northern Mali has offered some tolerance vis-à-vis terrorists of the GSPC, who stayed there 
several months after their hostage-taking in 2003 (Keenan 2004a), is furthermore well known 
for illicit trafficking (Gutelius 2007), and its border with Algeria is no longer guarded by 
military posts, a consequence of the peace treaties signed with the Tuareg rebellion in the 
1990s (International Crisis Group 2005). 
 
The Pan Sahel Initiative 
The second reason why commentators confuse Sahara and Sahel in West Africa has much to 
do with the very history of this “new threat”. Everything begins after September 11 2001, 
when the United States Department of State implements the Pan Sahel  Initiative (PSI), a 
programme dedicated to Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The initial objective of the PSI 
was to support border control capabilities, control illicit trade and enhance regional security 
(GlobalSecurity.org 2010). The GSPC hostage-takings in the Algerian desert in 2003 then led 
the  programme  to  focus  more  specifically  on  counter-terrorism  (Ellis  2004).  PSI  notably 
allowed for the training of the special forces of West African states from the military bases of 
Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu in Mali and Atar in Mauritania. At that time, the programme was 
supporting “Sahelian states”, i.e. states which had at least part of their territory located in the 
Sahel region, but mainly threatened by the movements in the Sahara. PSI was replaced by the 
Trans-Saharan  Counterterrorism  Initiative  (TSCTI),  which  involved,  in  addition,  all  the 
Maghreb states, as well as Burkina Faso, Senegal and Nigeria, and was incorporated in the 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) created in 2007. 
 
Common discourse has nevertheless held that the Sahel, as a whole, was a “dangerous area”. 
This interpretation is common in geopolitics, which usually considers the movement only as a 
consequence of the conflicting relationships between states and social actors, and not as a 
driving force in the production of space. 
 7 
 
Understanding networks in West Africa 
By mistaking the Sahel for the Sahara or by putting both of them in the same basket without 
linking them, the discourse on terrorism has important consequences for the tourism economy 
of West Africa. Compared to the 1998-2003 period during which one could easily travel from 
Mauritania to Niger, the Sahel-Sahara region is now almost totally considered as „dangerous‟. 
Warning  messages  from  European  and  US  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs  designed  to 
discourage tourists from travelling throughout the entire territory of Mali, Mauritania and 
Niger because of „a very high risk of kidnapping‟, have already led to a sharp drop in tourism 
activities. 
 
According to Freund (2010), President of Le Point-Afrique, a pioneer airline company in 
West Africa, 40% of the passengers to Mopti have cancelled their flights, even though the city 
is  located  300  km  south  of  Timbuktu.  The  company  has  recently  cancelled  its  flights  to 
Agades (Niger), Gao (Mali), Tamanrasset, Djanet and Timimoun (Algeria) and suspended 
their flights to Atar (Mauritania) for security reasons. Destinations such as the Dogon Country 
(Mali) or the W National  Park (Niger) have also  suffered from the same problems,  with 
important losses for the local populations involved in the tourism industry. Tourism is not the 
only activity likely to decline due to terrorism. Domestic economic activities could also be 
badly  affected  if  the  Sahel-Sahara  area  as  a  whole  is  considered  a  dangerous  region,  as 
reflected by the recent decision by Areva, a French energy company, to remove all European 
employees from the mining site of Arlit in Niger after seven of them were taken hostage in 
September 2010. 
 
More generally, the confusion between Sahara and Sahel is an obstacle in understanding the 
spatial nature of terrorist networks in West Africa. Most of the media, raising the question of 
terrorism  in  West  Africa,  include  a  map  showing  the  areas  „controlled‟  or  an  „area  of 
operations‟ of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. These areas cover a large part of Mauritania, 
northern Mali, almost all of Niger, northern Nigeria and northern Chad. According to Keenan 
(2009b), these maps were originally compiled by the United States European Command in 
charge of Africa and were used to justify the need of the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), and the 
Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Based on a territorial vision of space, 
they  give  only  a  partial  explanation  for  the  terrorist  movement  and  spatial  organisation. 
Furthermore, most of the kidnappings, murders and attacks that have happened in the Sahara-8 
 
Sahel region since 2003 occurred outside the „Terrorist Corridor‟ or „Terrorist Area‟ (see Map 
2). Needless to say, none of these Sahara-based maps depict the Sahelian climatic domain. 
 
Map 3. Terrorist Corridor and Terrorist Area according to the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) 
and Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) 
 
 
Sources: See Map 1; Keenan 2009b (PSI and TSCTI). Cartography: Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2005; 
modified by the authors. Note: see Appendix 1 for more information regarding each location. 
 
An alternative to this kind of mapping would be to use social network analysis, a set of 
methods which have proved increasingly well suited to understanding network-based formal 
or  informal  organisations,  including  criminal  and  clandestine  networks  from  a  scholarly 
(Sparrow 1991, McIllwain 1999, Klerks 2001, Kreps 2002, Ormerod 2006, Morselli, Giguère 
and Petit 2007) or military perspective (US Army 2006). Because space appears to be a key 
factor in terrorist networks, it would be particularly useful, in this respect, to spatialise social 
networks, i.e. to investigate „how an actor‟s position in geographic space can be analysed 
simultaneously with his or her position in social networks‟ (Radil, Flint and Tita 2010: 308). 
 
As  shown  by  Figure  1  this  approach  would  first  require  examining  the  extent  of  the 
topological space consisting of all social actors (A, B, C and D) and their relationships. In this 
type of  representation,  the distances  between network participants  generally refer to  their 
topological proximity, which is different from the distance commonly used in topographic 
mapping. The spatialisation of social networks would then require knowing, as precisely as 
possible, the location of the actors, i.e. the set of places (1, 2, 3 and 4) shared by the social 
actors in the geographic space as well as their relationships. By combining the network of 9 
 
actors with the network of places, we would then obtain two types of representations: the first 
one maintains the topological structure of the network of social actors and portrays in which 
places they belong; the second one preserves the topographic structure of the network of 
places and indicates which actors are linked to these places. 
 





This approach has been recently explored by Radil, Flint and Tita (2010) in their study of Los 
Angeles gangs, and by Flint et al. (2009) in their geography of interstate conflicts during 
World War I. In both cases, however, social networks are located in a particular area: urban 
gangs show a strong attachment to their turf, and conflicts can easily be attached to one state 
or another. The case of terrorist networks in West Africa is different, in the sense that both the 
social and spatial embeddedness of these actors is highly mobile. Terrorists have shifting 10 
 
alliances, depending on the amount of money they can use to buy secrecy and the level of 
trust they can establish with nomadic tribes. They also travel a lot to escape the military 
forces, look for new hostages, and communicate with other terrorists cells. 
 
The example of the GSPC hostage-takers in 2003-2004 is particularly revealing of this dual 
property: the terrorists travelled thousands of miles from southern Algeria to northern Mali 
where they stayed for several months and established alliances with leaders of local nomads, 
before moving to Niger through the Azawagh, Aïr Mountains, the Ténéré, and eventually 
ending up in Tibesti (Chad) where they were killed or captured. This represents a first journey 
of over 3000 km from Algeria to Mali, according to the hostages interviewed (Keenan 2007: 
33), and then  a second  journey  of over 2500 km  through some of the most inhospitable 
environments on the planet. Since then, other terrorists in the Sahel-Sahara have shown a 
similar  tendency  to  move  easily  over  long  distances:  this  was  notably  the  case  of  the 
Mauritanian  terrorists  who  killed  four  tourists  in  Aleg  in  2007  who  moved  to  Mali  and 
Senegal before they were eventually captured in Mauritania in April 2008. 
 
Therefore, it is impossible to rely on physical distance, contiguity, particular regions or fixed 
places to understand the relative position of terrorist actors in space because these properties 
become mobile as well. This problem has already appeared in previous studies on the Sahel-
Sahara societies, which have showed that the organisation of West African trade networks 
could hardly be approximated by static or purely hierarchical models, such as the central place 
theory (Walther 2008, 2009). In particular, the position and importance of urban markets did 
not correspond to the usual administrative or population hierarchies, which is explained by the 
fact that business activity is subject to constant change, in accordance with climatic, economic 
and political uncertainty. Contrary to what was found by spatial analysis in West Africa, the 
relative position and importance of urban markets (i.e. the centrality of places) is constrained 
by the presence of central economic actors (i.e. the centrality of traders). 
 
A similar observation was made by Lechartier (2005) when analysing political networks in 
Mauritania. In his study, Lechartier noted that tribal groups experienced shifting alliances and 
frequent conflicts, which did not favour the establishment of territorial political districts but 
led to the creation of places where tribes could temporarily meet and negotiate. These places 
are made necessary due to the fact that the power of nomadic tribes is based on the control of 
distance rather than on the control of the surface (Retaillé 1997), which reflects Castells‟ idea 11 
 
(1996)  according  to  which  it  is  more  important  to  control  certain  strategic  nodes  that 
struggling to control huge territories in the contemporary globalised world. 
 
Of course, trade and political networks have very different objectives from terrorist networks. 
While the former pursue monetary and political ends, the latter are more ideologically driven 
and  aim  at  spreading  fear  or,  more  prosaically,  raising  resources  by  taking  Westerners 
hostage. However, trade and political networks on the one hand, and terrorist networks on the 
other, share certain places. Certain terrorists are said to be highly involved in illicit trade, such 
as Mokhtar ben Mokhtar in northern Mali for example, or have established alliances with 
local or national political leaders. Despite obvious differences, the accumulated knowledge 
about  the  spatial  organisation  of  trade  and  political  networks  can  be  useful  for  a  better 
understanding of terrorist networks because both of them produce places in the same way. 
 
For both trade, political and terrorist networks in the Sahel-Sahara region, places are not fixed 
locations. In a world of permanent mobility, places are produced by the (often ephemeral) 
meeting of flows crisscrossing the Sahel-Sahara region rather than produced by a long-term 
investment in the territory, as in the „sedentary‟ world of states. The space resulting from this 
particular form of spatial organisation has been described as a „mobile space‟ (Retaill￩ 1995, 
2005, Retaillé and Walther 2011). This reflects the fact that, for trade and terrorist networks, 
mobility  is  the  overriding  principle  of  spatial  organisation.  Places  are,  therefore, 
interconnected by a circulation system that can deal with temporal variations, depending on 




The spread of terrorism is an incentive to renew the tools usually used by geographers to 
analyse space in West Africa. On the one hand, it is no longer possible to rely on a zonal 
model  to  explain  the  structure  of  the  Sahara  and  Sahel,  which  forms  a  single  space  of 
movement rather than a mosaic of semi-arid and arid lands. This paper suggests that the Sahel 
and Sahara should be seen as two interconnected spaces in the geography of terrorism in West 
Africa,  with  Sahara  being  increasingly  used  as  a  base  for  the  kidnapping  of  Westerners. 
Sahara and Sahel should be considered as a continuum, something that the territorial approach 
of states and geopolitics prevent us from understanding. 
 12 
 
On the other hand, it is no longer possible to rely on traditional cartographic representations to 
account for the organisation of networks. These must be analysed through new tools which 
are  able  to  spatialise  social  networks.  Spatial  representations  developed  by  geographers 
should take greater account of how space is culturally apprehended by social groups, and how 
it is physically used in daily practices. By considering the Sahelian and Saharan circulation, 
geographers should aim at thinking beyond territories (Retaillé 1989, 1993) and conceptualise 
such things as networks on the basis of its own dynamic, and not on the territorial model of 
the state. 
 
More generally speaking, the study of networks in space should contribute to fill the ongoing 
divide between geopolitics and geography, as far as the incorporation of space into political 
analysis is concerned (see O‟Loughlin 2000). The contribution of geography, highlighted in 
this article through the case of terrorism, is to suggest that movement is to be considered as a 
primordial force in the organisation of space and not as a consequence of flows occurring 
between fixed locations, as geopolitics and spatial analysis usually do. In such a „mobile 
space‟, movement is first, and all geographical and cartographical references, anchored in 
fixed localities, fail. That is why another space theory is necessary, not only in the case of 
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Appendix 1. Kidnapping, murders and attacks in West Africa since 2003 
 
N°  Event  Location and 
date 
Date  Release 
location and 
date 
Casualties  Responsible 






Arlit, Niger  15.10.10  Moved to Mali  /  Abdelhamid Abou 
Zaïd 





30.06.10  /  11 military and 
police officers killed 
Ibrahim Ag 
Bahanga 





moved to Mali 
20.04.10  /  1 death, 25.07.10  AQIM 





18.12.09  Mali, 16.04.09  /  AQIM 
5  3 Spaniards 
kidnapped
2 
PK170 (170 km 
north of 
Nouakchott) 
29.11.09  Mali, 10.03.10, 
23.08.10 
/  AQIM 
6  French aid worker 
kidnapped
2 
Ménaka, Mali  26.11.09  Mali, 23.02.10  /  Abdelhamid Abou 
Zaïd 















23.06.09  /  1 death  AQIM 
9  Malian officer 
involved in the 
arrest of terrorist 
groups assaulted
3 
Timbuktu, Mali  10.06.09  /  1 death  Unidentified 
assailants 
10  Malian soldiers 
attacked
4 
Tessalit, Mali  03-
04.06.09 
/  12 killed, some 
taken as hostages 
AQIM 
11  4 European tourists 
kidnapped
4 
Bani Bangou – 
Amberamboukan
e, Niger 









passed on to 
Abdelhamid Abou 
Zaïd, Mokhtar Ben 
Mokhtar and Yahia 
Djouadi 




Liptako (40 km 
north of Niamey) 
14.12.08  Mali, 22.04.09  /  Fulani (?), passed 
to Abdelhamid 
Abou Zaïd and/or 
Mokhtar Ben 
Mokhtar 





14.09.08  /  11 soldiers and a 
guide killed 
AQIM 





km N Ouadane) 
26.12.07  /  3 soldiers killed  AQIM 
15  French tourists 
attacked
1 
Aleg, Mauritania  24.12.07  /  4 killed, 1 wounded  AQIM (Maarouve 
Ould Habib) 
16  Gun battle between 
Malian Tuareg 




400 km NW of 
Kidal 
27.09.06  /  1 to 4 GSPC killed, 




Change  17 
 
17  21 Italian, 1 





border, north of 
Lake Chad 




/  New Resistance 
Group (Chad), then 









June 05  /  15 soldiers killed, 17 
wounded. 
150 GSPC fighters 





(100 km NW of 
Gao) 
June 04  /  /  Unidentified 
assailants 
20  Battle between 
Nigerien army and 
GSPC
8 
Border with Mali 
(Tintiboriden) 
April 04  /  Unknown  GSPC 
21  Battle between 





March 04   /  Unknown  GSPC 
22  Tourists robbed
9  Temet, Aïr 
Mountains, Niger 
23.02.04  /    Amar Saïfi GSPC 
23  Tourists robbed




/    GSPC (?) 
24  32 German, Dutch, 
















17 liberated in 
south Algeria 




7 terrorists killed in 
Algeria (13.05.03), 4 
killed in Mali 
(01.04), 13 (or 30) 
killed in Mali (or 
Algeria). 43 killed in 
Chad (08.03.04). 1 
hostage died of heat 
exhaustion (07.03) 
Amar Saïfi and 
Abdelhamid Abou 
Zaïd 
Sources: 1=AFP; 2= Barrada 2010. 3=Schmitt and Mekhennet 2009; 4=Keenan 2009a; 5=Keenan 2006; 6=Cline 
2007; 7=Keenan 2004b; 8=International Crisis Group 2005; 9=Keenan 2009b; 10=Keenan 2007; 11=Ellis 
2004a; 12=Choplin 2008. B.P. 48
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